providing fair benefits to their employees. 12 This movement has attempted to move beyond corporate social responsibility 13 or "greenwashing,"-i.e., branding one's company as a "green" business to attract customers but spending nominal money or efforts in actually reducing the company's environmental "footprint." 14 Social enterprises truly "serve two masters" 15 -they have a profit motive, but their social and environmental missions are at the core of their business models. 16 In the early 1930s, Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd famously debated in the pages of the Harvard Law Review whether a for-profit corporation should combine both social mission and profit motives. Berle argued that "all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation . . . are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears." 17 Responding to Berle, Dodd argued that "there is in fact a growing feeling not only that business has responsibilities to the community but that our corporate managers who control business should voluntarily and without waiting for legal compulsion manage it in such a way as to fulfill those responsibilities."
18 Dodd advanced the notion that the corporation "has a social service as well as a profitmaking function."
19
This article does not take on the broader theoretical debate as to whether corporations should attempt to pursue both economic and non-economic objectives. That debate is the topic of other legal scholarship. 20 Rather, this article starts from the premise that the social enterprise movement is here and growing, as indicated by the number of states that have adopted new corporate forms to house social enterprise ventures and the number of business schools-both in the United States and in Europe-that are training business leaders and entrepreneurs in the field of social enterprise. 21 Legislatures are beginning to provide social investors with off-the-shelf corporate forms to employ for social enterprise. In the last two years, two new corporate forms were adopted by or proposed in state legislatures across the United States-the flexible purpose corporation and the benefit corporation. 22 The benefit 19 Id. at 1148. 20 See generally Stephen M. 22 Proponents assert that these corporate forms will hail a new way of doing business. Upon passage of the Benefit Corporation legislation in Maryland (the first state to adopt it), Andrew Kassoy, the cofounder of B Lab, the non-profit organization that drafted the Benefit Corporation legislation is corporation was adopted in seven states, including New York and California, and proposed in four others. 23 The flexible purpose corporation was adopted in California in October 2011 and was introduced into the Indiana legislature in January 2012. 24 The proliferation of these new corporate forms has been hailed by many as, at least, an innovative step forward in business and, at most, a powerful alternative to corporate greed. 25 However, a question remains as to how these new corporate forms fit into the existing principles of corporate law and corporate governance. How will traditional corporate law principles be adapted when applied to these new corporate forms? Can an old dog (corporate law) learn new tricks (social enterprise)?
This article begins the project of examining new corporate forms and how traditional corporate law principles might be applied to them. The first endeavor of this project is to examine the fiduciary duty of directors of a flexible purpose corporation under circumstances that would trigger the Revlon rule. 26 Using Revlon as a proxy allows for examination of the corporate law principles of the "shareholder wealth maximization norm" and "shareholder primacy" and how these norms might inform the fiduciary duties of directors of these new corporate forms. In later quoted as having said, "'For the first time, we have a market-based solution supporting investors and entrepreneurs who want to make money and make a difference.'" Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Language, CSRWIRE (Apr. 14, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.csrwire.com/ press_releases/29332-Maryland-First-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation. Likewise, a petition in favor of the Flexible Purpose Corporation legislation claimed that the "legislation would allow for a new breed of organization where sustainable flourishing of people and the planet could be achieved in one organization." R. Todd Johnson, Help Pass California Legislation that Will Allow Businesses to Do Well and Do Good, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/petitions/ help-pass-california-legislation-that-will-allow-businesses-to-do-well-and-do-good (last visited Apr. 8, 2012). There is even some suggestion that these new corporate forms should receive preferential legal treatment. Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies That Profit, but Can Tap Charity., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2011, at B1. articles, this author intends to examine these and other corporate law principles and their application to social enterprises in different contexts, including other major transactions like initial public offerings and everyday transactions that could lead to "mission-drift."
Beyond examining the fiduciary duties of directors of flexible purpose corporations, the project has two missions: (i) to inform state courts how they might interpret corporate law principles in litigation surrounding these new corporate forms, and (ii) to similarly inform directors, shareholders, and potential investors about how courts might interpret their rights and duties under state corporate law. Until (i) corporate law scholars and practitioners propose how traditional corporate law principles should be applied to social enterprise, and (ii) courts adjudicate issues facing these new corporate forms to create a body of case law, this author predicts that social entrepreneurs and social investors will remain wary of using the new corporate forms for their businesses.
To contribute to this necessary discussion, this article examines the shareholder wealth maximization norm and shareholder primacy through the lens of corporate acquisitions of social enterprises. As the market for products and services produced by social enterprises grows, traditional profit-maximizing corporationswhich may have given limited attention to their social or environmental outputs in the past-will want a piece of this market share and will be able to make a rapid market entrance by acquiring an established social enterprise.
27
Under certain circumstances, once a social enterprise offers itself for sale, Delaware's Revlon rule would impose heightened judicial scrutiny of the transaction and would require the directors to obtain the best sale price reasonably available, without considering the social enterprise's social and environmental efforts.
28
The shareholder wealth maximization norm and shareholder primacy are both implicated by the Revlon rule. 29 However, these two principles are not 27 See infra Part II.B. 28 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
29 I do not wish to overstate the significance of Revlon. Subsequent Delaware cases have narrowed the scope of the Revlon rule and some scholars have eschewed its import. Nevertheless, as it stands, the Revlon rule is the most proscriptive use of the shareholder wealth maximization norm in corporate law. And to some extent, corporate managers and their general counsel heed its directive. As such, the Revlon rule presents a useful lens through which to examine the shareholder wealth maximization synonymous with the Revlon rule..
30
Shareholder wealth maximization requires directors to make decisions based solely on the maximization of shareholder value.
31
Shareholder primacy requires directors to advance and prioritize shareholder interests over non-shareholder interests. 32 Together, the two principles dictate that when bidders make competing offers for control of the corporation, directors will face heightened judicial scrutiny when a shareholder challenges the proposed or resulting acquisition. 33 Courts will inquire as to whether directors sought the best value reasonably attainable for the corporation. 34 This article argues that if the shareholder wealth maximization norm is applied to flexible purpose corporations facing a sale or change in control transaction, it will be applied to the detriment of shareholder primacy. Persons or entities most likely to invest in flexible purpose corporations-namely, impact and social investors-do not want shareholder value prioritized over social and environmental considerations.
35
The California flexible purpose corporation law explicitly rejects the shareholder wealth maximization norm and allows adoption of charitable purposes or consideration of other constituencies (including the community, society, and the environment) as "special purposes" of the corporation. 36 Thus, for a flexible purpose corporation, shareholders have both economic and noneconomic interests. 37 norm and shareholder primacy and how these concepts might be modified to account for the noneconomic interests of shareholders of a flexible purpose corporation. 30 37 
Id.
Nonetheless, rejecting the shareholder wealth maximization norm creates an accountability gap and possibly gives directors unfettered discretion in their decisionmaking. 38 To be clear, the California flexible purpose corporation statute does not address how directors and managers of flexible purpose corporations are to account for both the economic and non-economic purposes of the firm. 39 Moreover, the flexible purpose corporation statute is permissive and does not require directors to take into account the special purposes of the corporation.
40 Because (i) business decisions of directors are generally protected by the business judgment rule 41 and (ii) directors are not required to maximize shareholder value or pursue the special purposes of the corporation, directors are unaccountable to shareholders, and shareholder primacy is at risk. 42 This article discusses and evaluates other potential accountability mechanisms, including a heightened standard of review for directors' decisions affecting the sale or change of control of a flexible purpose corporation.
Part II of this article proceeds with an introduction to social enterprise and its potential to attract large corporate acquirers. Part III presents the shareholder wealth maximization norm and the Revlon rule. Part IV examines the flexible purpose corporation. Part V applies the concept of shareholder primacy to reject the shareholder wealth maximization norm for flexible purpose corporations engaging in a sale or change of control. Part VI considers the gap in directors' accountability left by rejection of the shareholder wealth maximization norm and poses potential solutions to fill the gap, and Part VII offers closing propositions.
II. THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE SPECTRUM

A. Defining Social Enterprise
Many terms are used to refer to organizations that blend profit motive with social and environmental missions, including "shared value," 43 "social business," 42 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(C) (Deering 2012). 43 Porter & Kramer, supra note 13, at 6 (defining "shared value" as "policies and operating practices that enhance the competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions in the communities in which it operates").
"social entrepreneurship," 45 "social enterprise," 46 "mission-driven" businesses,
47
"double bottom line" businesses, 48 and "triple bottom line" businesses. 49 Each term varies depending on the person or entity defining the concept, and the mainstream 44 Muhammad Yunus, the founder and managing director of Grameen Bank uses the term "social business" to describe a business that is either (1) a "non-loss, non-dividend company devoted to solving a social problem and owned by investors who reinvest all profits in expanding and improving the business" or (2) a "profit-making company owned by poor people, either directly or through a trust that is dedicated to a predefined social cause," particularly improving the owners' economic positions. MUHAMMAD [S] ocial enterprise' will refer to any business model that, to a significant degree, has a missiondriven motive. This mission-driven motive may be exclusive of a profit motive or blended with one. The mission-driven motive may be primary and the profit motive may be secondary, or vice versa."). 48 YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 12. 49 Id. media often uses these terms interchangeably. 50 However, scholars and practitioners alike distinguish between them. 51 Theoretically, the organizational spectrum has two extremes. On one end of the spectrum are organizations that pursue social and environmental missions and eschew profit motives, such as non-profit organizations. 52 On the other end of the spectrum are organizations that focus solely on profit-maximization and disregard social and environmental missions-these might be called profit-maximizing businesses.
53
Somewhere between these two extremes lie enterprises that blend profit motives and social missions. 54 To those whose interests lie closer to the end of the spectrum that prioritizes social and environmental values, "social enterprise" means using business techniques to advance socially and environmentally beneficial goals.
55
According to Social 50 See J. Gregeory Dees, The Meaning of "Social Entrepreneurship," at 1 (May 30, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.caseatduke.org/documents/dees_sedef.pdf ("Many associate social entrepreneurship exclusively with not-for-profit organizations starting for-profit or earnedincome ventures. Others use it to describe anyone who starts a not-for-profit organization. Still others use it to refer to business owners who integrate social responsibility into their operations."); see also Fei, supra note 46, at 37 ("Depending on who is attempting to define the term, varying emphasis may be given, for example, to whether a social enterprise operates for private profit and, if so, to what degree."). The Social Enterprise Alliance, a non-profit membership association that promotes the work of social enterprises, regards "social entrepreneurship" (as distinct from "social enterprise") as all forms of socially beneficial business activities, including corporate social responsibility. 51 See, e.g., YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 3-4 ("Terms such as 'social enterprise,' 'social entrepreneurship,' and many others are frequently used in literature devoted to efforts to address problems such as poverty. Although these terms are used in varying ways by different writers, they are generally used to refer to subconcepts within either the profit-making world or the traditional world of non-profit organizations. Thus, they are not the same as what I call social business." (emphasis in original)). 52 See id. at 1 (suggesting that two differing ends of the spectrum include "a traditional profitmaximizing business (which describes practically all private companies in the world today)" and "a not-for-profit organization (which relies on charitable or philanthropic donations)"). 53 See id. 54 I speak of mission and motive here, rather than "non-profit" and "for-profit" because a social enterprise can organize as a non-profit public benefit corporation or as a for-profit corporation. 55 See Social Enterprise, supra note 50 (defining "social enterprise" as "an organization or venture that achieves its primary social or environmental mission using business methods"). See also LANE, supra Enterprise Alliance, Inc., a non-profit organization that promotes the goals of social enterprise, a social enterprise must "directly address social needs through [ There are also those who promote "shared value" and "blended value"-i.e., "policies and operating practices that enhance the competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions in the communities in which it operates." 59 Under the concept of shared value or blended value, there is no choice between profits and social value; both are pursued simultaneously to optimize economic and social value, with social and environmental benefits measured relative to costs. 60 In advocating a blended value approach, Jed Emerson, founder of one of the first U.S.-based venture philanthropy firms, note 47, at 4 (stating that "a social enterprise can be viewed as one not motivated by profit, in that any profit motive takes a back seat to a mission centered on curing an acute social malady"). 56 Social Enterprise, supra note 50 (emphasis in original). 57 SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS 4 (2010) ; see also Moran, supra note 35, at B5 ("At a social venture, the social mission is expected to be at least as important as the moneymaking mission."). 59 Porter & Kramer, supra note 13, at 6. 60 Id. at 6-7. This article illustrates the meaning of shared value by contrasting it with the fair trade movement through which farmers are paid premiums for their crops. Id. at 5. Under the principle of shared value, social value is not optimized through payment of premiums because the cost is equal to the benefits and resources are simply redistributed. Id. Instead, shared value:
focuses on improving growing techniques and strengthening the local cluster of supporting suppliers and other institutions in order to increase the farmers' efficiency, yields, product quality, and sustainability [,] . . . lead[ing] to a bigger pie of revenue and profits that benefits both farmers and the companies that buy from them.
observed that "all organizations, whether for-profit or not, create value that consists of economic, social and environmental value components-and that investors (whether market-rate, charitable or some mix of the two) simultaneously generate all three forms of value through providing capital to organizations." 61 Because value creation necessarily consists of a blend of social, environmental, and financial values, the blended value approach attempts to maximize the impact of total value rather than any one component that is arguably indivisible from the others.
62
High profile examples of companies that can be included in the spectrum of social enterprise include TOMS Shoes, Inc.-for every pair of TOMS shoes a customer buys, TOMS donates a pair to a child in a developing country in order to alleviate foot diseases caused by parasites in the soil; 63 uying a pair of GROOBS is also giving a new pair of shoes to someone who is homeless in your city and may not own a pair of shoes or a child that has never worn a pair of shoes in their life and has an enormous chance of contracting intestinal worms by not wearing a simple pair of shoes."); Our Philosophy, TWINS FOR PEACE, http://www.twinsforpeace.com/philosophie/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2010) (discussing the company's donation of "medical supplies, school tuition, books and supplies to children living in impoverished countries," as well as the one-for-one shoe model). 64 Meg Cadoux Hirshberg, The Full Story, STONYFIELD ORGANIC, http://www.stonyfield.com/aboutus/our-story-nutshell/full-story (last visited Mar. 10, 2012). Started in the late 1970s as a non-profit organization to teach sustainable agricultural practices, Stonyfield is now a for-profit "green" business. It has maintained its dedication to an environmental mission by purchasing its milk from organic family farms, using sustainable packaging, reducing its environmental impact and use of natural resources in production and transportation of its products, and donating 10% of its profits to environmental causes. Id. bookseller that generates funding for non-profit literacy programs by selling books reclaimed from college campuses and libraries; 65 H.U.M.A.N. Healthy Vending-a company that fights obesity by making healthy food accessible through re-designed vending machines placed in schools and offices, often at little cost to the location provider; 66 and Greyston Bakery-a Yonkers, New York-based bakery that dedicates itself to community renewal by providing sustainable employment-including fair wages and benefits-to low-income community members and reinvesting all profits in the Greyston Foundation, which provides jobs, job training, affordable housing, youth services, and health care to the Yonkers community. 67 Each of these social enterprises arguably engages in more than just corporate social responsibility, 68 cause marketing, or "greenwashing."
69
B. Potential for Acquisitions
A social enterprise with steady or high growth (or the potential for such) might face a sale or change in control transaction, either because the company's stock price reflects its pursuit of a social or environmental mission or because profitmaximizing businesses want a piece of the market share for conscientious consumers. 70 That is, a social enterprise may face a change in control transaction precisely because company earnings are not its only bottom line. 71 The social enterprise may forgo profits to achieve a social or environmental mission. 72 For example, TOMS Shoes has given away over one million pairs of shoes.
73
The management of TOMS Shoes made a strategic decision to start manufacturing operations in Ethiopia and Argentina as part of its social objective to create jobs in the areas where it donates shoes. 74 Some would argue that choosing to provide jobs where it provides charity rather than ship shoes from China, where it also has manufacturing operations, could come at the expense of company earnings if the labor and raw materials were more cheaply available in China. 75 The social 70 "Profit-maximizing business," or "PMB," is a term used by Muhammad Yunus to describe companies that seek profits, even if the company also has social or environmental missions. See YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 1. 71 However, Lynch and Walls note that this traditional thinking does not take into account the real costs of business-companies do not bear the full costs of the products they sell when the social and environmental detriments caused by their profit-maximizing activities are externalized and kept off corporate financial statements.
enterprise's earnings affect its stock price and entice a buyer, either hostile or friendly, in an attempt to achieve greater earnings and higher stock prices for the company.
76
Many would argue, however, that the financial success of a social enterprise may be because of-and not in spite of-its social and environmental mission, since many consumers prefer socially responsible and environmentally sustainable products and services. 77 Indeed, it seems more likely that a social enterprise will be targeted by bidders because the target has access to a new and growing market of socially responsible business; profit-maximizing businesses will want to expand into that market by acquiring an established participant rather than starting their own brands.
78
Such an acquisition leads to an immediate immersion in the market, marked by the legitimacy of the target social enterprise. 79 Mergers within the same industry can also reduce operating costs by eliminating duplicative employees, plants, and offices, reducing competition within the market. 84 Once a merger is announced, other companies within the industry are likely to make their own offers in order to remain competitive:
As markets become dominated by fewer and fewer companies, these companies that fail to grow not only may wind up less competitive on a global scale and unprepared to deal with changing technologies or develop new ones, but also may find their strategic options limited if they miss the opportunity to gain a significant market share by merging with a preferred partner. 85 As more and more social enterprises are established, there is a real possibility that larger, profit-maximizing corporations will target them in order to gain these advantages. How will corporate law principles be applied to handle these acquisitions? What obligation, if any, do the target boards have under traditional corporate law principles to ensure that the social enterprises' missions survive?
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION NORM ON SOCIAL ENTERPRISES
A. Ben & Jerry's Revisited
When directors of a social enterprise start down the path of a change in control transaction or sale, the shareholder wealth maximization norm is implicated. Generally, the shareholder wealth maximization norm stands for the premise that directors' decision-making should be grounded in and directed at maximizing the wealth of the corporation's shareholders, who are the residual claimants on the . 83 Block, supra note 71, at 20. 84 Id. at 19-20. 85 Id. at 20. corporation's assets and earnings. 86 Under Delaware law, the Revlon rule embraces the shareholder wealth maximization norm and shareholder primacy for change in control and sale transactions by requiring directors to focus solely on the firm's intrinsic value to the exclusion of other considerations, such as employees, the environment, and other constituencies (although directors are still given "wide latitude to customize a merger or sales process in the best interests of a target company and its stockholders"). 87 The sale of Ben & Jerry's illustrates this issue. In 2000, founders Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield, who controlled Ben & Jerry's board of directors along with director Jeff Furman, allowed Unilever to purchase the corporation, presumably under threat of director liability should they not sell the company to the highest bidder.
88 Stakeholders and scholars alike lamented the takeover of a mission-driven hometown company by a profit-driven international conglomerate. 89 Debate surrounds (i) whether Cohen and Greenfield had to sell to Unilever as the highest bidder under the shareholder wealth maximization norm, or (ii) whether Cohen and Greenfield used fiduciary duties as a "scapegoat" to hide their changed priorities and effectively "sold out." 90 In determining what the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, a director of a corporation which has a class of voting stock registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as the same may be amended from time to time, may, in addition, consider the interests of the corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors and customers, the economy of the state, region and nation, community and societal considerations, including those of any community in which any offices or facilities of the corporation are located, and any other factors the director in his or her discretion reasonably considers appropriate in determining what he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and the long-term and short-term interests of the corporation and its stockholders, and including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation . . . . Ben & Jerry's social and environmental missions eleven years after the change in control. 93 However, some state corporate laws do not contain constituency statutes.
94 Vermont adopted its own constituency statute shortly before the Ben & Jerry's acquisition in an attempt to preempt the acquisition and the application of the shareholder wealth maximization norm because of the potential loss of business and jobs in Vermont. 95 Where a constituency statute is not available and the shareholder wealth maximization norm is applied, risk-averse directors of a social enterprise-fearing liability for a breach of fiduciary duties-may feel obligated to recommend an acquisition by an entity that intends to scale back or even abandon the social or environmental mission of the social enterprise.
96
B. The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm
Scholars and courts express a director's fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of a corporation as a duty to prioritize the shareholders' interest over interests of other constituencies or to maximize shareholder wealth. 97 A frequently the interests of constituents other than shareholders "under all circumstances, including the circumstance in which a decision has been made to sell." Id. at *3. 93 Page and Katz, supra note 2, at 244-45. 94 In a free enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employe[e] of the owners of the business. He has [a] direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society . . . .
100
Professor Bainbridge has justified the shareholder wealth maximization norm in different terms. 101 Bainbridge argues that wealth maximization is "the only common denominator" amongst shareholders. 102 That is, although shareholders may have varied interests (as in the case of socially responsible investors), a significant purpose of investing is to maximize one's own wealth. 103 Wealth maximization is the interests of the corporation, and that they remain appropriately informed under the circumstances. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a) (2010). only "common goal" "[i]n a large and diverse shareholder community." 104 Bainbridge further argues that the cost of equity capital will rise if directors are allowed to pursue interests other than shareholders' interests. 105 Allowing directors to take non-shareholder interests into account creates more risk for shareholders, but that risk is not reflected in shareholders' rate of return; shareholders will, therefore, invest stock elsewhere or monitor management more closely, causing the cost of equity to rise. 106 Although the shareholder wealth maximization norm has been fundamental to the normative constructs of corporate law, there is debate as to whether it accurately describes the current state of corporate law. On one hand, some scholars claim that the shareholder wealth maximization norm is rarely espoused in case law. 107 These scholars argue that the shareholder wealth maximization norm flies in the face of (i) the business judgment rule, (ii) constituency statutes that allow directors to consider the interests of non-shareholders, and (iii) statutory provisions that protect directors from personal liability to the corporation and its shareholders, 104 Id. 105 Id. at 1433. 106 See id. at 1433. Bainbridge's view (i) fails to acknowledge that social and environmental returns are a measurable, common goal of social investors and (ii) fails to take into account the likelihood that a corporation will face increased costs if it ignores non-economic interests. See Porter & Kramer, supra note 13, at 5 (acknowledging "social harms or weaknesses frequently create internal costs for firmssuch as wasted energy or raw materials, costly accidents, and the need for remedial training to compensate for inadequacies in education"); Moran, supra note 35, at B5 (quoting Wes Selke, an investment manager at a social-impact venture capital firm, who observed that "'more people [are] taking interest in investing in companies that are doing the right thing right from the start'"). 107 [T]he mainstream of corporate law remains committed to the principles espoused by the Dodge court. By mainstream I refer of course to Delaware's courts and legislature which are still our premier corporate lawmakers. As it has long done, Delaware law still requires directors to put shareholder interests ahead of those of nonshareholders. At least in Delaware, the shareholder wealth maximization norm thus remains a more accurate description of the state of the law than any of its competitors. This erosion of the duty of care is due largely to the business judgment rule and Section 102(b)(7)-type charter provisions that exculpate directors from any monetary liability arising from duty of care claims. The business judgment rule stands for the premise that courts will not secondguess good faith decisions made by independent and disinterested directors. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). The courts, therefore, defer greatly to corporate boards in their decision-making so long as a rational process was employed and there are no claims of bad faith or self-dealing (i.e. a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty). See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig. 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). 109 Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm, supra note 20, at 1423-25; see also ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 30, at 2261 (stating its opinion that "the Delaware courts have stated the prevailing corporate common law in this country: directors have fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders which, while allowing directors to give consideration to the interests of others, compel them to find some reasonable relationship to the long-term interests of shareholders when so doing").
As this debate continues, it is generally agreed that there is still one area of law where the shareholder wealth maximization norm is clearly implicated-in the context of a sale or change in control transaction.
110
C. The Revlon Rule
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the shareholder wealth maximization norm by holding that during an inevitable sale or dissolution of a company, the directors of the target corporation must allow market forces to "operate freely to bring the target's shareholders the best price available for their equity." 111 Revlon faced a hostile takeover offer from Pantry Pride, Inc. and sought a friendly bidder in Forstmann Little & Co.
112 The Revlon board planned several defensive measures to thwart Pantry Pride's tender offers, including the purchase of 10 million shares by Revlon in exchange for senior subordinated notes containing "covenants which limited Revlon's ability to incur additional debt, sell assets, or pay dividends unless otherwise approved by the 'independent' (non-management) members of the board."
113 The Revlon board later approved Forstmann's proposal, in part, to protect the noteholders, who had threatened to sue the directors when the value of the notes fell upon announcement that the covenants in the notes would be waived. 114 The share price of Forstmann and Pantry Pride's offers were relatively similar, but Revlon favored Forstmann, partially because (i) Pantry Pride's chairman and CEO, Ronald Perelman, had a reputation for acquiring companies through junk bond investments and (ii) Pantry Pride intended to break up Revlon and dispose of its assets. where directors contemplate the break-up of the corporation or institute a sale of the corporate enterprise do courts require directors to focus solely on profit maximization"). 111 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184. 112 Id. at 176-79. 113 Id. at 177. 114 Id. at 178-79. 115 Id. at 176-77 (citing Revlon CEO Michael Bergerac's "strong personal antipathy to Mr. Perelman" and Pantry Pride's strategy to acquire Revlon through junk bond financing).
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's ruling that "the Revlon directors had breached their duty of loyalty by making concessions to Forstmann, out of concern for their liability to the noteholders, rather than maximizing the sale price of the company for the stockholders' benefit." 116 The court held:
A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders. However, such concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.
117
Notably, the court reasoned that by seeking a friendly bidder and authorizing negotiation of a merger with Forstmann after Pantry Pride's initial hostile tender offer, the Revlon board had put the corporation up for sale. 118 Once Revlon's sale became inevitable, defensive tactics used to promote bidding and bring shareholders a higher share price were permissible, but the directors' breached their duty of loyalty when employing defensive tactics for the purpose of ending further bidding. 119 The Revlon rule dictates that, once a company is up for sale, directors cannot favor a particular acquirer over the other while engaged in an active bidding process. 120 Rather, the "board's primary duty becomes that of an auctioneer responsible for selling the company to the highest bidder."
121 Once in Revlon mode, the merger transaction and board's decision-making process face heightened scrutiny when challenged in court. 122 116 Id. at 179. 117 Id. at 182 (citation omitted). 118 Id. 119 Id. at 183 ("[W]hile those lock-ups which draw bidders into the battle benefit shareholders, similar measures which end an active auction and foreclose further bidding operate to the shareholders' detriment."). 120 Id. at 184. 121 Id. 122 Id. California has yet to consider a case where it might follow Delaware's Revlon rule. California state courts have only cited the Revlon case in two opinions, one published and one unpublished. In 2008, the California Court of Appeals considered application of the Revlon rule in a case involving a breach of fiduciary duty claim because the internal affairs doctrine required application of Delaware Subsequent Delaware cases made clear that the Revlon rule does not apply to all corporate acquisitions, and, therefore, a target board can attempt to structure its transaction to avoid such duties. For instance, Revlon duties are not triggered in stock-for-stock mergers in which a majority of shares in the surviving entity will be held by a "fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders representing a voting majority" because the target shareholders' control premium will survive the merger. 123 However, where a shareholder or group of shareholders will hold a controlling block of stock in the resulting entity, Delaware courts have held that Revlon duties are triggered. 124 In a transcript ruling, the Delaware Chancery Court suggested that the Revlon rule would apply even in a merger where the consideration is a mix of cash and stock and the target stockholders would obtain a control premium in the acquirer.
125
Very recently, the Delaware Chancery Court extended the Revlon rule to a merger of two publicly-held corporations, where there was no change in control but where the shareholders of the target company received an even mix of cash and stock as consideration for their shares, stating that the transaction deprived the stockholders of their investment's "long-run potential. The Smurfit-Stone decision suggests that deal planners should expect that any merger including a significant amount of cash consideration is likely to be subject to "intermediate" judicial review under Revlon. At the same time, the decision confirms that Delaware continues to afford informed and well-advised independent enlarged the circumstances under which the Revlon rule is triggered, although the court acknowledged that the Delaware Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue.
127
This uncertainty continues to feed into the risk-aversion of directors and corporate managers as they contemplate acquisitions:
A fair statement of current [Delaware takeover] doctrine is that a board sells "control," and thus triggers Revlon duties to seek the highest price and be rigorously fair between competing bidders, when it agrees to exchange a controlling stake in the company, either for cash or non-voting securities, or for voting shares in an acquirer with a controlling shareholder but not when it exchanges 100% of its voting shares for voting shares in a widely held acquirer, most commonly through a stock-for-stock merger. (Whether Revlon applies to the remaining possibility, exchange of a less than 100% stake for a widely held acquirer's voting shares, isn't clear.)
128
When Revlon is triggered is important to the future of many social enterprises, including those social enterprises that incorporate as flexible purpose corporations. One can imagine many scenarios in which the acquisition of a social enterprise, given the fact that it is likely a start-up or early stage company, will trigger Revlon duties. Because a social enterprise is likely to be a small entity (in both size and revenue), any acquisition by a larger profit-maximizing business will not be a "merger of equals" and could therefore result in a diminution of target stockholders' voting power as it is swallowed by the larger entity, of particular concern to Delaware courts. 129 Or the potential acquirer may cash out all target shareholders and continue operations as a division of the larger corporation (as was the case with Ben & Jerry's, Burt's Bees, directors wide latitude to customize a merger or sales process in the best interests of a target company and its stockholders. and Tom's of Maine) or continue the social enterprise's operations in a whollyowned subsidiary of the acquirer.
130
Professors Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman have explained the logic of the Revlon line of cases as embracing a hidden value theory-that is, Delaware's takeover jurisprudence embraces the notion that the firm's value is visible and knowable only to its directors and not to shareholders, the stock market, or potential acquirers.
131 Black and Kraakman explain that, starting with Smith v. Van Gorkom, Delaware takeover jurisprudence asserted the notion that the board of directors must determine the firm's intrinsic value and seek that value for the firm's shareholders in a change of control transaction.
132 "The board cannot rely on shareholder approval to discharge its duty, nor may it rely principally on prices set by the stock market or the takeover market. Because others may miss the company's hidden value, the board must value the firm itself, preferably with an investment banker's assistance." 133 The hidden value theory affirms the Revlon rule's adherence to the shareholder wealth maximization norm such that wealth maximization becomes an exacting standard but also provides well-informed directors with discretion on structuring an acquisition to achieve that value.
134
According to Black and Kraakman, "language in other cases appears to sanction board consideration of other concerns," but "judicial permission to weigh nonshareholder interests is not a license to ignore shareholder interests; it simply recognizes the broad sweep of the board's discretion to decide what actions will maximize long-run shareholder value." 131 Black & Kraakman, supra note 128, at 521, 559-60 (rejecting the hidden value model in favor of a visible value model with changes in control governed by a bilateral decision-making process, but acknowledging that Delaware courts rely on the hidden value model). 132 Id. at 525-26. 133 Black & Kraakman, supra note 128, at 526. 134 Id. at 527. 135 Id. at 527-28 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) and Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) for the holdings that a target board may consider constituencies other than shareholders when implementing takeover defenses). The Revlon rule has also been supported by a control premium theory-where a target corporation transfers control to a new controlling shareholder (whether the target corporation previously had a controlling shareholder or not), the target shareholders (other than the controlling shareholder) must
IV. THE FLEXIBLE PURPOSE CORPORATION
Responding to the dominance of the shareholder wealth maximization norm and the desire for corporate law to enable businesses along the social enterprise spectrum, corporate law scholars and practitioners worked to rethink the corporate form. The flexible purpose corporation was crafted by the California Working Group for New Corporate Forms, a group of ten corporate lawyers and law professors convened in 2008. 136 The flexible purpose corporation allows directors and officers to pursue social and environmental objectives along with shareholders' economic interests for those corporations that adopt or convert to the form. 137 The working group acknowledged the uncertainty of case law surrounding the shareholder wealth maximization norm as to when a director can be held liable for actions taken at the expense of shareholder value. First, the working group argued, the business judgment rule may provide limited protection for directors and officers who attempt to consider all business decisions in light of both the social mission and profit motives of the corporation. 138 Second, the protection of the business judgment rule is limited with respect to change of control transactions where "boards and management generally have a fiduciary duty to act solely in the interest of maximizing shareholder value."
139 Finally, even if the business judgment rule would provide liability protection for specific business decisions based on the be paid for the sale of those control rights; directors must maximize shareholder value to achieve the control premium for such shareholders. 138 See FPC-FAQ, supra note 136, at 5. 139 Id.
dual objectives of the corporation, directors remain risk-averse and take conservative positions due to the threat of litigation. 140 The working group reasoned that:
[b]ecause these rules are judicially created and interpreted, and because litigation is prevalent, even where judicial guidance exists, directors and their lawyers tend to apply risk-averse interpretations, resulting in the practical effect that consideration of "blended value" seldom succeeds in the boardroom if it threatens the maximization of short-term or long-term shareholder profitability.
141
The flexible purpose corporation is an attempt to break through these barriers posed by the traditional corporation. Specifically, the flexible purpose corporation may adopt "at least one 'Special Purpose' that directors and managers may consider in addition to traditional shareholder economic interests when determining what is in the best interests of the Flexible Purpose Corporation and its shareholders with respect to decisions about operations, policies and transactions."
142
These special purposes are: (A) One or more charitable or public purpose activities that a nonprofit public benefit corporation is authorized to carry out.
(B) The purpose of promoting positive short-term or long-term effects of, or minimizing adverse short-term or long-term effects of, the flexible purpose corporation's activities upon any of the following:
(i) The flexible purpose corporation's employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors. 140 Id.; see also Bisconti, supra note 94, at 793-94 (stating that:
[T]here is no legal authority protecting a board that rejects a higher value bid out of consideration for nonshareholder interests. Instead, Revlon and its far-reaching precedent provide authority for punishing management for not accepting the higher bid. Since constituency statutes are merely permissive and lack an enforcement mechanism, they do little more than give boards the legislative permission to consider the effects of an acquisition on nonshareholder constituencies. Consequently, a board can disregard these interests without fearing shareholder backlash.).
(ii) The community and society.
(iii) The environment.
143
The flexible purpose corporation does not take a redistributive approach. That is, directors of the corporation do not have fiduciary duties to non-shareholders and there is no private right of action against directors by non-shareholder constituents.
144
Non-shareholder constituents have other means of protecting themselves and expressing their interests-i.e., through contracting with the firm.
145
By giving only shareholders a private right of action, the flexible purpose corporation statute fully embraces the shareholder primacy norm but acknowledges that shareholders' interests are more than just financial, as will be discussed in Part V.
146
At the same time, the statement of special purpose in the corporate charter puts the world and investors on notice that both financial and non-economic values will be pursued.
147
V. REJECTING WEALTH MAXIMIZATION BUT EMBRACING SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
Given the legislative history and purpose of the flexible purpose corporation, it is clear that California courts should not apply a Revlon-type rule to directors of flexible purpose corporations engaging in sale or change of control transactions so far as the Revlon rule requires directors to obtain the best price reasonably attainable at the expense of the special purposes outlined in a flexible purpose corporation's charter. 148 In addition to the legislative history, my basis for rejecting the shareholder wealth maximization norm but embracing shareholder primacy flows from the nexus of contract theory of corporate law.
143 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(A)-(B) (West 2012). 144 See Bisconti, supra note 94, at 783. 145 See id. at 800. 146 See infra Part V. 147 The working group designed the flexible purpose corporation with this notice in mind: "Rather, the Special Purpose requirement is designed to put shareholders and potential shareholders on notice that the corporation will pursue agreed interests that may (or may not) align with profit maximization, depending upon the business judgment of the directors, taking into account the Special Purpose." FPC-FAQ, supra note 136, at 7. 
A. A New Norm For Impact and Social Investors
The nexus of contract theory has widespread support amongst corporate law scholars.
149
Under the nexus of contract theory, "the corporation is properly understood as a legal fiction representing the nexus of a set of contracts among the multiple factors of production provided by the organization's various constituencies."
150
The corporation brings together the complex and conflicting interests of its constituents, 151 which include not only its suppliers, employees, creditors, and management, but also its shareholders, as providers of capital.
152 Just as suppliers and employees enter into supply and employment agreements with the firm, the shareholders' contractual relationship with the firm is set forth in the firm's organizational documents and the corporate laws (common law and statute) of the state of the firm's incorporation. 153 The firm is not an individual. It is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may "represent" other organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations. In this sense the "behavior" of the firm is like the behavior of a market, that is, the outcome of a complex equilibrium process. claim on the corporation's assets. 154 According to contractarians, the "principal right that flows from the shareholders' status as the corporation's residual claimants" is the shareholder wealth maximization norm. 155 If the contractarian view of corporate law is to be accepted, then corporate law becomes a default set of rules for the standardized form contract that reduces bargaining costs and facilitates private ordering. 156 There is "no inherently correct, natural, or logical" rule derived from the nexus of contracts theory other than those that are created from the bargaining amongst the corporation's constituents. 157 Therefore, that the shareholder wealth maximization norm flows from shareholders' status as the corporation's residual claimants is not an inherent or natural rule but a normative decision resulting from bargaining amongst constituents that can be changed depending on the shareholders' preferences and priorities.
158
Defenders of the shareholder wealth maximization norm assert that either (i) shareholders do not derive any utility from their investments other than through pecuniary interests or (ii) shareholders' non-pecuniary interests are diverse and immeasurable. 159 This assertion cannot stand, as applied to the flexible purpose corporation and the type of investor that a flexible purpose corporation is likely to attract-impact investors and social investors. 160 Although flexible purpose corporations are free to seek and receive capital investment from traditional investors, the flexible purpose corporation is likely to attract impact and social investors, including sustainable and responsible investing funds (which use environmental, social, and governance ("ESG") criteria to vet investment activities), 161 venture philanthropy firms (which pool funds and distribute them to 154 Bainbridge, Unocal at 20, supra note 150, at 777. 155 Id. 162 and, depending on the business model, private foundations (which make mission-related investments and socially responsible investments).
preferences to the achievement of social and environmental results; many impact and social investors expect to realize financial returns equal to those of traditional investments, although many also expect to make less.
167 And yet, the expectation that impact or social investments achieve results equal to those of traditional investments should not be confused with the shareholder wealth maximization norm. Impact and social investors' do not always expect the directors and officers to pursue such profits at the expense of social and environmental value creation. 168 Arguably, the preferences of impact or social investors differ from those of traditional profit-maximizing investors, and, thus, impact and social investors should be able to bargain for a norm that differs from wealth maximization. 169 How do we know that the flexible purpose corporation incorporates the right set of default rules that impact and social investors would otherwise bargain for on their own? To answer that question, we must look to empirical evidence. The amount of capital flowing into flexible purpose corporations will provide evidence as to whether the flexible purpose corporation statute has chosen the right set of default rules. Because shareholders who invest in a flexible purpose corporation are put on notice that the flexible purpose corporation is fundamentally different than a traditional profit-maximizing corporation, the flexible purpose corporation will attract shareholders who accept this modified contract. 170 Those shareholders are impact and social investors willing to optimize profits and social and environmental 167 benefits.
171 Unlike a constituency statute that applies to all corporations in the state where such a statute has been adopted, shareholders have to opt-in to the special purpose of a flexible purpose corporation by either purchasing stock in a flexible purpose corporation or by voting their shares in favor of converting an existing traditional corporation into a flexible purpose corporation.
172 Measurement of the extent to which investments flow into a flexible purpose corporation will provide evidence that social investors are prepared to displace the shareholder wealth maximization norm and accept a new norm for understanding shareholder value that incorporates social and environmental value. 173 Notably, we can compare the amount of capital flowing into flexible purpose corporations with the amount of investment in another corporate form that enables social enterprise-the benefit corporation. 174 Collection of empirical evidence in addition to a comparison with the 171 In support of the flexible purpose corporation legislation, the Corporations Committee of the State Bar of California recognized the need to accommodate impact and social investors' economic and non-economic interests through new default rules for flexible purpose corporations:
In response to investor demand and the expressed desires of the California Legislature, we support providing consenting business owners a vehicle to structure their business affairs in a novel way to achieve their multiple purposes. We appreciate that some business owners desire their businesses to achieve some higher good, in addition to doing well. We think it is important that California law provide business owners and organizers flexibility to achieve their goals, provided that shareholders are adequately protected by procedural safeguards. 173 Nonetheless, the flexible purpose corporation statute became effective January 2012, and I concede that gathering empirical evidence of social investors' investment in this new corporate form will take time as social entrepreneurs begin to incorporate their social ventures as flexible purpose corporations. Moreover, the flexible purpose corporation has only been adopted in one state thus far, whereas the benefit corporation is available in several states-in measuring the capital flow into these forms one would need to control for this fact, possibly by just comparing the capital flow in California which has both the flexible purpose corporation and the benefit corporation. 174 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Notably, Patagonia, a well-known and privately-held outdoor clothing and gear company, was among the first California corporations to convert to a benefit corporation in January 2012. benefit corporation will assist scholars and practitioners in understanding the merit of flexible purpose corporations.
B. Measuring the Best Interests of the Corporation
To the extent that flexible purpose corporation investors have non-economic interests, their interests must be advanced along with the shareholders' financial interests in order to uphold shareholder primacy. 175 Pursuit of economic interests and the special purpose should define the new meaning of "best interests of the . . . corporation" with respect to flexible purpose corporations. 176 Advancement of the special purpose should be measured and reported the same way that financial returns are-i.e., with accounting methods that monetize and report results relative to costs. 177 In 2004, the Research Initiative on Social Entrepreneurship ("RISE"), with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and Columbia Business School, documented and evaluated the effect of social impact accounting on corporations, social ventures, non-profits, foundations, and investors. 178 RISE found that although no standard measure for social impact accounting yet exists, best practices have emerged. 179 Two commonly used methods are Social Return on Investment (SROI) and benefit-cost analysis. 180 RISE aimed its report at institutional social investors and social entrepreneurs, helping them "create a set of output indicators that can be tracked relatively easily over time." 181 Likewise, the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, a U.S.-based non-profit organization, is creating standard social accounting tools in the same manner that the Financial Accounting Standards Board created standards for financial accounting. 182 As the various methods of assessing social impact continue to develop and firms begin reporting them as they would financial results, investors will be able to demonstrate to boards (with their wallets) the value of common and measurable social and environmental interests. 183 Moreover, boards may be able to use social impact accounting standards in their evaluations of whether to pursue a sale or change of control transaction.
184
VI. A GAP IN DIRECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY
The rejection of the shareholder wealth maximization norm for flexible purpose corporations facing a sale or change of control transaction triggering Revlon duties causes significant problems, the most notable of which is the creation of a gap in directors' accountability to shareholders.
A. The Problem of "Sell-Out" or Mission-Drift
Assume that courts do not apply the shareholder wealth maximization norm to flexible purpose corporations engaging in a sale or change of control transaction, given (i) rejection of the norm in the flexible purpose corporation statute, 185 and (ii) adherence to shareholder primacy where shareholders are expected to be social and impact investors with both economic and non-economic motives. 186 The absence of the shareholder wealth maximization norm leaves a gap in director accountability to shareholders when engaged in a sale or change of control transaction. 187 This is because the directors' responsibility to consider the special purpose of the flexible purpose corporation is permissive and not mandatory. 188 The pertinent part of the statute reads:
In discharging his or her duties, a director may consider . . . factors, and give weight to those factors, as the director deems relevant, including the short-term and long-term prospects of the flexible purpose corporation, the best interests of the flexible purpose corporation and its shareholders, and the purposes of the flexible purpose corporation as set forth in its articles. 189 While this provision may give directors the necessary discretion to oversee and manage the flexible purpose corporation, it enables the possibility of "sell-out" or mission-drift-i.e., prioritizing shareholder gain at the expense of the social or environmental mission of the firm.
show that the transaction was "entirely fair" without regard to the special purpose of the flexible purpose corporation. 194 
B. Filling the Gap Through Shareholder Voting Rights & Contract
When creating the flexible purpose corporation, the working group recognized the possibility of this subversion of the corporation's special purposes:
[T]he traditional corporate form presents risks for the entrepreneur seeking to maintain the mission of a Special Purpose during the life of an early-stage corporation, without the possibility or probability that investors will shift the company away from the original Special Purpose over time (particularly at the time of a change of control), in favor of additional profitability instead. This difficulty in "anchoring the mission" represents a significant issue for entrepreneurs utilizing a blended value model.
195
The working group attempted to address the issues of mission-drift and sell-out. First, the flexible purpose corporation statute requires that the corporation maintain transparency by reporting its efforts to achieve the special purpose through an annual report. 196 Directors must "disclose publicly information regarding objectives, goals, measurement and reporting of the impact or 'returns' of actions vis-à-vis such Flexible Purpose Corporation's Special Purposes."
197 This increased transparency is meant to give shareholders the ability to hold the flexible purpose corporation's directors and officers accountable for their actions to further the flexible purpose corporation's special purpose, just as financial reporting and disclosures act as an accountability tool for financial results. 198 Presumably, armed with this information, dissatisfied shareholders can attempt to vote out the board or exit the firm themselves by selling their shares. 199 accountability mechanisms. 200 Nonetheless, shareholder voting as an accountability mechanism is less plausible where a founder or group of early investors controls the board or where the collective action problem exists, and exit becomes problematic when a market for start-up or early-stage company's shares does not exist. Second, a supermajority (i.e., two-thirds) vote is required to merge with or convert to a traditional corporation or to materially alter the special purpose in the articles of incorporation of a flexible purpose corporation. 201 Shareholders can simply reject a proposed acquisition that does not further the special purpose of the flexible purpose corporation, or if the controlling shareholder holds two-thirds of the shares, the minority shareholders can rely on dissenters' rights for compensation for their shares. 202 The supermajority vote requirement, thus, is as strong an accountability mechanism as plausible under the traditional framework of corporate law. 203 Moreover, Ben & Jerry's was a well-established brand that was able to insist on the trademark licensing arrangement. 206 Other social enterprises may not have the same bargaining power to make such contractual arrangements.
As for supermajority voting, shareholder approval does not discharge directors' fiduciary duties. 207 Shareholder ratification alters a court's standard of review of the directors' actions, moving from the business judgment rule to an "entire fairness" standard. 208 Additionally, in an active bidding situation, it is just as likely that the merger proposal will not make it to a shareholder vote without litigation; the bidding parties may seek a preliminary injunction prior to the shareholder vote, and courts will have to interpret the fiduciary duties of the directors of the flexible purpose corporation without regard to shareholder approval (this was the case in Revlon and the subsequent cases that attempted to clarify the Revlon rule). 209 Therefore, while supermajority shareholder approval and contractual mechanisms certainly mitigate the accountability gap left by rejecting the shareholder wealth maximization norm, accountability through fiduciary duty should still be explored.
C. Filling the Gap Through Fiduciary Duty
While directors must be given the necessary deference to exercise their decision-making authority, they must also be held accountable for their actions to advance both the profit motives and special purpose of the flexible purpose corporation in order to avoid sell-out or mission drift. 210 Shareholder primacy warrants that directors' interests should be aligned with shareholder interests.
contributed to a necessary discussion and has begun to map out how the shareholder wealth maximization norm and shareholder primacy might be applied. While I plan to continue this project, I implore others to add their voices to the discussion.
